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This article investigates the relation between socioeconomic development and
democratization in contemporary Turkey with reference to modernization theory. Based on
studies showing that there is a positive correlation between socioeconomic modernization
and democratization, it is argued that the relatively increased level of socioeconomic
modernization in contemporary Turkey has created a more conducive environment for further
democratization and democratic consolidation. In this regard, Turkey’s GDP per capita,
income distribution (Gini coefficient), level of industrialization and urbanization, educational
attainment, and human development index (HDI) are analyzed in terms of their influence on
democratization. Taking into account Turkey’s increased level of socioeconomic develop-
ment, EU-based reforms, and recent Freedom House ratings, it is argued that Turkey could
be getting closer to democratic consolidation.
 
The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, characterized Turkey’s





 Contemporary civilization in his understanding implied material, sociocul-
tural, and political modernization. As of 2010, the question as to how close Turkey
is to the goal of catching up with contemporary civilization in terms of development
and democracy is a politically relevant and important issue that will be discussed
with reference to modernization theory. According to modernization theory, socio-
economic development facilitates democratization. In this regard, recent improve-
ments in Turkey’s socioeconomic modernization signal a positive development and
will be put under scrutiny in relation to democratization.
Regarding Turkey’s level of socioeconomic and political modernization, Turkey
is a candidate country for EU membership, and its economy and democracy are
approaching a level of certain maturity. Turkey is the world’s seventeenth largest





democratization reforms and relative civilianization, Turkish democracy is at a point
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are, however, some factors which could hinder democracy’s consolidation in









 problems concerning the Kurdish




 and the military’s continuing influence in
politics. However, at the macro level, certain sociopolitical trends can be observed
that signal that democracy in Turkey is approaching a situation in which military
coups become much less likely. The most solid factor leading to such a positive
expectation for Turkish democracy is that Turkey today has a relatively large and
effective middle class that takes democratic representation seriously, resists anti-




While anti-democratic groups and parties are neither minor nor ineffective in
Turkey, it is becoming increasingly more difficult for these groups to reverse
democratization, thanks to the EU process, the existence of plurality in the media,




While discussing the issue of democratic consolidation in Turkey, it would be
appropriate to develop a more systematic and theoretical framework. First of all,
liberal democracy as a political regime does not emerge in a void but rather in places
where a sufficient level of capital accumulation, urbanization, communications
technology, a relatively high literacy, and human development are in place. Without
the improvements in these fields and the development of a sufficiently large middle
class, it can be argued that there would be little demand for democratic representa-
tion. However, if a developed middle class does exist, it is quite difficult for the
political elite to suppress democratic demands for too long. In this regard, the
increase in democratic demands and support for democratic regime in Turkey could
possibly be linked to the increasing level of socioeconomic development and the
emergence of a larger pro-democratic middle class. The connection between
development and democracy, in this regard, is a crucial and central issue that needs
to be addressed. This article, therefore, applies modernization theory to Turkey and
Turkish democracy and makes two main contributions: it applies modernization
theory to Turkey using recent data and information, and sheds light upon the
relation between development and democratization; it also analyzes the possible
reasons for the fluctuations in Turkey’s democracy ratings over the last few decades
(as reported by Freedom House) and presents comments on Turkey’s increased
chances for democratic consolidation.
 
Modernization Theory and Democratization
 
Modernization theory originates from Seymour Martin Lipset’s article, “Some
Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legiti-
macy,” which appeared in 1959 in 
 







showed that there is a positive correlation between development and democracy. In
a subsequent study, Lipset stated that “democracy is related to the state of economic
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into two groups—the first comprising European countries, North America,
Australia, and New Zealand , and the second being those from Latin America—
according to their regime types as stable democracies, unstable democracies, unsta-
ble dictatorships, or stable dictatorships. In order to find if there were any significant
socioeconomic differences among countries having different regime types, Lipset
investigated the level of socioeconomic development among the countries within
each regional group. Eventually, he discovered that the more democratic countries
within both groups had dramatically higher levels of socioeconomic development.
That is, they had higher levels of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and literacy
when compared to their less democratic counterparts. Lipset found that the more
democratic countries had a greater per capita income, a greater number of radios,





 Lipset thus concluded that economic development is the “single





 This conclusion constitutes the gist of what is called modernization theory.
Several others scholars have empirically investigated the relation between
development and democracy, and they have consistently found a high positive




 On the other hand, Lipset’s modernization theory and
its political economy has been challenged by authors who put more emphasis on





 and some scholars such as world systems theorists and
dependency theorists who argued that the “core countries” had a benefit in keeping
the “dependent countries” undemocratic and unresponsive to popular demands to
keep low wages in these dependent economies upon which the wealth of the core
countries rested. This criticism expressed by authors such as Samir Amin has found




Among authors who investigated the relation between macro factors and democ-
ratization, various scholars found supportive empirical evidence for Lipset’s argu-
ments. For example, Coleman conducted a study of 75 countries in which he
clustered them into three categories—competitive, semi-competitive, and authori-
tarian—and found that “countries with competitive regimes had the highest levels of





 Olsen found that an index of 14 socioeconomic factors had a
0.83 correlation with an index of political development/democracy, and the correla-





 It can be said that such evidence strengthens the validity of Lipset’s argu-
ments concerning the relation between development and democracy.
It is argued by various authors that higher socioeconomic development leads to a





 and demand for accountability of the political realm




 It is argued that the middle classes serve as a control




 The presence of
intermediary organizations, which is probably the result of a certain level of wealth,








































 Evaluating and commenting on Lipset’s argument as to how and through
which mechanisms development fosters democracy, Diamond concluded that a
careful reading of Lipset’s arguments reveals that economic development promotes









Lipset concluded that economic growth and increase in income engender a culture
of democracy and provide the foundations for democratic institutions. As to why
income is important for democracy, Lipset argued that increased wealth reduces the
overall level of objective inequality, weakening status distinctions, and increasing




 Lipset also argued that in order for a gradualist and




Similarly, Diamond argued that 
better socio-economic conditions generate the circumstances and skills that
permit effective and autonomous participation…[and] when most of the
population is literate, decently fed and sheltered, and otherwise assured of





Diamond found that liberal democracies are seen almost exclusively among high





 Within the middle range, he observed that partially open
countries are mostly seen among lower-middle income countries and sometimes
among upper-middle income countries. Overall, Diamond concluded that there is a
high correlation between economic development and democracy. Diamond investi-
gated the statistical relation between a country’s income level and democratic rating
according to Freedom House. He tested the data for statistical significance with two
forms of the chi-square test, both of which showed the association to be “highly




As to why a low level of wealth and income could hinder the necessary institu-
tions for democracy, Diamond noted that in poor countries, favoritism and nepo-
tism undermine the possibility of a well-functioning bureaucracy, which is




 It can be argued that increasing levels of wealth
might be functional for establishing a well-functioning democracy. Similarly,
Barro noted that “increases in various measures of the standard of living forecast a
gradual rise in democracy” and that “democracies that arise without prior economic




 It seems that the positive relation between income
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The relation between development and democracy, Diamond noted, is not
unilinear, 
but in recent decades has more closely resembled an “N-curve”—increasing
the chances for democracy among poor and perhaps lower-middle income
countries, neutralizing or even inverting to a negative effect at some middle
range of development and industrialization, and then increasing again to the
point where democracy becomes extremely likely above a certain high level
economic development (roughly represented by a per capita income of $6000




Although there are a few democracies in the world such as India or Mongolia that
have an income per capita of between $1000 and $2000, it is observed that most
democracies have an income per capita over $5000–6000. Whether there exists a
certain threshold concerning the relation between income and democracy, Przewor-
ski noted that “no democracy ever, including the period before World War II, fell in






The number of studies concerning the relation between income distribution and
democracy are limited in number; however, there are a few well-conducted and
methodologically sound studies that indicate a positive correlation between




 Regarding the relation between
income distribution and democracy, Przeworski notes: 
Democracies are more likely to survive when the Gini coefficient or the ratio
of incomes of top-to-bottom-quintile are lower. Data concerning functional
distribution are more extensive and they show the same: democracy is four
times more likely to survive in countries in which the labour share of value








 conclude that “democracy is much more likely to survive in




 These authors found
that “the expected life of democracy in countries with shrinking inequality is about
84 years, while the expected life of democracies with rising income inequality is
about 22 years.” (These numbers refer to the aggregate lifespan of democracies with
rising and declining inequality among 135 countries over 40 years.) In a similar way,
Boix and Garicano, based on their empirical investigation, concluded that “economic
equality and capital mobility promote democracy… By contrast, at higher levels of




Regarding the reason why better distribution of income is important for democ-




































It is only when individuals break out of poverty that they begin to demand a
role in and provide support for democracy. Thus, the removal of mass poverty
is essential to inculcate within the population the attitudes and behaviours that
are supportive of democracy. Economic growth “leads to an increase in the





Lipset argued that reducing poverty is critical for securing the basis of democracy
and for equalizing the subjective perception of honor and equality of some citizens
in the eyes of other citizens. On this issue, he wrote: 
The poorer a country, and the lower the absolute standard of living of the lower
classes, the greater the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower classes as





Chong argued the relationship between inequality and democracy might be a non-
monotonic relationship and argued that “poor and highly unequal countries are the
ones where such a link [between inequality and democracy] tends to be positive”





 Taking into consideration these studies together, although one needs to
be cautious about the relationship between equality and democracy, it seems that
there could be a positive relation between the two. The possibility of mutual causa-




Industrialization can be measured by the percentage of employed people in industry
compared to agriculture and the per capita commercially produced “energy” used in
the country. Lipset noted that the average percentage of employed people working
in agriculture and related occupations was lower for more democratic European




The differences in per capita energy employed in the country, Lipset noted, are also
equally large. Such large differences denote differences in terms of historical
development in terms of industrialization. Cutright found the correlation between




Urbanization, which is a natural result of industrialization, is also a crucial factor
in terms of democracy. Harold J. Laski asserted that organized democracy is the




 The argument that urbanization is directly linked to democ-
racy is best depicted by Lerner, who argued that democratic participation is the end
result of an evolutionary historical process, the initial stage of which is urbanization,





 Concerning this sequence of evolutionary development, Lerner put
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comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources
which characterise the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix
develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases, literacy
and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for




 performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at
first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks
required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the
elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a
society begin to produce 
 
newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on
a massive scale
 
. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this





find in all advanced modern societies. For countries in transition today, these
high correlation’s suggest that literacy and media participation may be
considered as a supply-and-demand reciprocal in a communication market




A study supporting Lerner’s argument was done by Cutright, who found that the




 This shows that the




James Bryce argued that if education does not make people good citizens, it makes




 Almond and Verba concluded that educa-





argued that “through better education, citizens come to value democracy more and
to manifest a more tolerant, moderate, restrained, and rational style with respect to




 Many authors have found that there is a positive
correlation between education and democracy. Cutright found that the correlation
between education and democracy is 0.74. In terms of the relation between educa-
tion, democracy, and democratic values, Lipset noted that “the most important
single factor differentiating those giving democratic responses from others has been
education. The higher one’s education, the more likely one is to believe in demo-




 Winham found that there is even a





argued that education leads to more moderate and democratic citizens, stating: 
Education presumably broadens man’s outlook, enables him to understand the
need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines,
and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices…. The higher
one’s education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and



































education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence




Concerning the issue of how education leads to further democracy, an intermediary
mechanism, communication media, is put forth by authors. Diamond argues that
“education…stimulates the expansion of communication media, which then has a




 Similarly, Inkeles found that education and expo-
sure to mass media create an active and participatory citizenry, which is critical for




 It can be argued that literacy
is the most important component of education in relation to democracy. Lipset pointed
out that according to his data set “the more democratic countries of Europe are almost
entirely literate: The lowest has a rate of 96 percent, while the less democratic nations
have a literacy rate 85 percent. In Latin America, the difference is between an average





 The numbers Lipset mentions concerning literacy have changed since then,
but the relation he points out still more or less applies today. Literacy in relatively
more democratic countries such as Argentina (97.2 percent), Chile (95.2 percent), and
Brazil (88.6 percent) are higher than in Guatemala (69.1 percent), Honduras (80.0






Human development consists not only of economic development but also of social
and cultural development. The UN measures human development by the human
development index (HDI), which is composed using three main criteria: income,
educational attainment, and life expectancy. The HDI was created in 1990 and is
widely used by social scientists to assess a country’s level of socioeconomic devel-
opment. The HDI has a maximum rating scale of 100; a HDI of 80–100 denotes
“high human development,” 50–79 denotes “middle human development,” and HDI




In regard to the relation between human development and democracy, Diamond
notes that the HDI is a better predictor of a country’s level of democracy than the GNP
per se. He found that while there is 0.51 correlation between the GNP and the index
of political freedom, there exists a considerably higher correlation between the HDI




 Thus, it is reasonable to say that a
country’s human development is highly correlated with freedom and democracy. The
reason for such a high positive correlation might be explained by the fact that high
human development may form some basis for higher social capital and generally more
civilized conditions, which might be more conducive for democracy.
 
Modernization Theory and the Case of Turkish Democracy
 
Turkey’s socioeconomic and political data expose a particularly interesting case.
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the threshold of “high” values that lead one to think that Turkey might be on the
verge of experiencing a leap in terms of socioeconomic and democratic develop-
ment. Although there exists no linear relationship between development and democ-
racy, from a probabilistic point of view socioeconomic development in Turkey
seems to be promising in terms of democratic survival. Bringing together some of
the pivotal developmental factors mentioned above as well as the Freedom House
ratings, it can be seen that Turkey is quite close to meeting the minimal official










; “high” HDI; and a “free” rating in the Freedom House report.
The implications of the factors shown in Table 1 as well as of other relevant
socioeconomic factors are discussed throughout the next pages. Turkey’s socioeco-





As mentioned above with reference to Przeworski, in no country that has surpassed
an income per capita of $6,055 has democracy ever fallen. Although it is not easy to
establish a definite income level to be necessary or sufficient for democratic consol-
idation, Turkey’s 2008 income level today seems to be at a level conducive to demo-
cratic survival. Turkish GDP has surpassed $10,000, and Turkey could soon reach
the level of “high income country” despite decreasing growth. Turkey’s income gives
it an advantage for further democratization and democratic consolidation when one
takes into consideration that there is high correlation (0.51) between income and
democracy. Turkey’s income level is close to the income level of Eastern European
and Latin American countries that have recently experienced democratic consolida-






The Turkish Statistical Institute reported that there has been some improvement in
Turkey’s income distribution (Gini coefficient) in recent years. Below is presented a




Turkey’s Socioeconomic and Political Ratings



























: Turkey’s GDP per capita and Gini coefficient values are taken from



































countries’ Gini coefficient in order to paint a general picture, and a table of Turkey’s
Gini values.
As Table 2 shows, the inequality of income in Turkey increased during 1987–





 It seems that as long as amelioration in distribution of income
continues for some time, Turkey’s Gini coefficient in the coming years might
become closer to low-medium values (such as 0.30–0.35). This would be important
in terms of achieving a larger middle class and a more substantive and popular
democracy in Turkey. Turkey’s income distribution, although not totally satisfac-
tory yet, could become better and more conducive for a more popular and participa-
tory democracy if the amelioration in income distribution continues without any
interruption in the coming years. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), a conservative party in government, has a relatively limited
vision of “social justice” due to its neoliberal priorities, and it is dubious as to
whether the AKP would have the intention to decrease Turkey’s income inequality













Source: United NationsHuman Development Report, 2007–2008, www.undp.org.
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Industrialization and Urbanization
Turkey started industrialization in the late nineteenth century and experienced a
high level of industrialization, especially in the second half of the twentieth century.
As of 2010, Turkey is considered a NIC (newly industrialized country) along with
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, China, India, Thailand, and the Philip-
pines.62 Turkey has a relatively developed bourgeoisie, which is predominantly pro-
democratic. It is observed that globalization, increasing capital, and better technical
education increase industrialization in Turkey. As a result, Turkey has become an
“emerging market” in the global economy. It can be argued that Turkey’s relatively
developed industry and market economy are advantages for democratization.63
It has been reported that urbanization in contemporary Turkey, parallel to
increased industrialization, was 75 percent as of 2008.64 The level of urbanization in
developed countries varies from 65 to 90 depending on geographical and demo-
graphic factors.65 It is observed that Turkey’s level of urbanization is roughly within
the range of “developed” countries, though on the lower end. Turkey’s level of urban-
ization increased especially since the 1970s and continues to increase. The increase
in the level of urbanization, a result of migration, has created certain urban problems,
such as poverty and crime. On the other hand, increased urbanization has created
greater opportunities for literacy and education, social mobility, and political
representation, which altogether increase the chances for further democratization.
Education
A widely used index for measuring educational attainment is the UN’s education
index, which is  one of the three components of human development index. The educa-
tion index is formed as a composite of two factors: literacy rate and gross enrollment
rate. The index has a maximum of 100. In terms of the first component of the educa-
tion index (i.e. the literacy rate), Turkey has made a great deal of improvement in
recent decades. The rate of literacy in Turkey was approximately nine percent in 1923,
when the Turkish Republic was founded; it was 88.1 percent as of 2008 (and will
likely exceed 90 percent in 2011).66 Turkey’s gross enrollment rate was 71.1 percent
in 2006.67 The education index was 82.4 in 2008, which is considered to be in the
“high” category by UN standards.68 As a result, considering the high correlation
between education and democracy, Turkey’s relatively increased rate of literacy and
gross enrollment rate are important assets for further democratization in Turkey.
Human Development
Turkey’s human development index was 79.98 in 2008. To compare, the HDI of
Norway was 96.8, the United States 95.0, Portugal 90.0, Mexico 84.2, Brazil 80.7,
the Philippines 74.5, Honduras 71.4, South Africa 67.0, India 60.9, Pakistan 56.2,
Tanzania 50.3, Rwanda 43.5, Niger 37.0, and Sierra Leone 32.9. Turkey’s HDI































exceed the threshold which will be reflected in the 2009 report (to be published in
October 2009). Turkey will thus be considered in the category of “developed coun-
tries” for the first time by the UN.69 Turkey’s being at the verge of a “high” HDI in
this regard is an important and promising factor for democratization, when the 0.71
correlation between HDI and the Freedom House score of a country is considered.
Turkey’s Freedom House Ratings over the Years
Taking into account the fact that Turkey’s level of income per capita, income
distribution, and human development index are close to certain threshold values,
further democratization could be expected. In fact, this expectation seems to be
supported by both Turkey’s meeting the Copenhagen political criteria already as
well as Turkey’s relatively satisfactory Freedom House scores. Turkey’s Freedom
House rating in 2008, as shown in Table 1, was 3.0, which implies a “semi-free”
regime, one that is approaching the “free” category. Freedom House is a US-based
non-governmental organization that publishes reports every year on the condition of
freedom and democracy in various countries around the world and rates the coun-
tries on a composite score from 1 to 7. The composite score is actually constructed
by two factors, civil liberties and political liberties. Both political and civil liberties
are evaluated by an index from 1 to 7 (1 denotes most free, and 7 denotes most
authoritarian), and combining these two indices, a single composite index is created
by the arithmetic average of the two indices. This index is used to evaluate whether
a country would be considered either “free,” “partly free,” or “non-free.” A
composite index from 1.00–2.50 is defined by Freedom House as free, 2.50–5.00 as
partly free, and 5.50–7.00 as non-free. Such numerical representations might be
methodologically disputed; however, they can somehow offer a general idea about
the comparative situation of freedom and democracy in a country.
In order to provide an account of Turkey’s scores over the years, and in order to
be able to make comments on Turkey’s chances of democratic consolidation in the
coming years, the yearly performance of Turkey during 1972–2008 is shown in
Table 3 and Figure 1.
Figure 1. Turkey’s Freedom Ratings over the Years, Published by Freedom HouseSourc : See http://www.freedomhouse. rg/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls.Figure 1 shows that Turkey achieved “free” ratings during the 1974–79 period (a
rating of 2.5) despite the fact that there was political terror in those years.70
However, it is observed that the 1980 coup decreased this score to “partly free”
(5.0). It is a generally admitted fact that the military junta caused significant author-
itarianization in Turkey during 1980–83. However, the country made a re-transition
to democracy in 1983, after which some relative civilianization took place in the
Table 3. Democratization and Authoritarianization: Freedom House Scale
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0
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country. During 1983–92, Turkey experienced a significant civilianization and
democratization (reaching a rating of 3.0 during 1986–92). However, in the after-
math of this relatively free period, Turkey experienced another wave of authoritari-
anization during 1992–2001, and its rating worsened to values around 4.5.
Possible Reasons for the Fluctuations in Turkey’s Freedom Ratings: Income 
Threshold, Market Development, and EU-Turkey Relations
As to why there have been fluctuations in Turkey’s freedom ratings over the years
and why Turkey could not consolidate its democracy in the 1970s or in the 1990s
despite favorable conditions, it can be argued that Turkey’s level of income per
capita in those years was still below a certain threshold. Therefore, despite relatively
high freedom ratings, democracy could not be consolidated then. However, it can be
reasonably argued that Turkey today has surpassed a certain level of income and
development, and therefore could be in a more advantageous position in terms of
democratic survival. This argument has the advantage of relying on evidence from
all the existing democracies since 1975 that have survived after surpassing the
income threshold of $6,055.71 It can be argued that surpassing a certain threshold of
income could be critical in solving many social and political problems in Turkey,
including the Kurdish issue, which is predominantly a result of socioeconomic
underdevelopment as well as deficiencies in Turkey’s practice of liberal norms.72
































Institutionalization is another critical issue that needs to be mentioned in terms of
explaining the problems of liberalization and democratization in Turkey. Demet
Yalçın Mousseau argues that weak market development has been the underlying
reason as to why individual rights and civil liberties have not become rooted in
Turkey.73 She asserts that a mass market based on equality and rule of law has not
been institutionalized in Turkey, and instead of this, rent-seeking and clientelism
through state mechanisms and political parties have been widespread. Mousseau
claims that if Turkey can foster a more institutionalized market economy, this will
lead to a more institutionalized democracy, which then would allow for more civil
rights and liberties. Concerning this issue, she wrote: 
A liberal political culture that respects individual rights may be connected to
the development of an economy where most are dependent on the market rather
than in-groups for their livelihood and a regulatory state that enforces the rule
of law impartially.74
Mousseau contrasts South Korea with Turkey and argues that South Korea pulled
ahead of Turkey in terms of democratization by virtue of “creating regulated
markets with egalitarian policies for the creation of a modern, broad-based mass
market economy.”75 Mousseau argues that Turkey has a chance to follow the same
path as South Korea for further democratization and a more liberal political regime.
This liberal institutionalist approach may possibly be complimentary in its implica-
tions for the argument in this paper: a better institutionalized market economy can
lead to higher and more equally distributed income, which can in the longer run
enhance democratic survival.76 It can be argued that the market economy in Turkey
has started to become more institutionalized and better regulated following the 2001
economic crisis. Income distribution has also been relatively improved since then,
and all these factors seem to be advantages for the institutionalization of the market
economy, as well as the institutionalization of a more liberal and democratic regime
in Turkey.
Another critical factor that needs to be mentioned in regard to explaining the fail-
ure of democratic consolidation in the 1980s and 1990s is the EU factor. Turkey’s
lack of EU support from 1986 to 1992 might have been a critical factor as to why
Turkey was not able to make a leap from 3.0 (partly free) to 2.5 (free). Here, it
should be mentioned that the EU has a two-fold effect on Turkey’s democracy,
which probably enhance each other mutually. First, the EU exerts direct political
influence on Turkish democratization by encouraging democratic reforms, which
leads to further democratization and also liberalization.77 Additionally, EU-based
socioeconomic reforms in Turkey lead to further socioeconomic development,
which facilitates further democratization. Regarding the EU factor in relation to
Turkish democratization, the EU’s influence might be similar to the EU’s influence
on the early stages of Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish democratization.
Turkey’s EU-related harmonization process, along with other facilitative factors,
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successful rating is also in line with the fact that Turkey sufficiently met the Copen-
hagen political criteria as of December 2004. It should be mentioned that Turkey’s
rating in 2008, which was 3.0, is merely a half-point away from 2.5. That is to say,
taking into account the 2008 score, Turkey is quite close to the threshold of obtain-
ing a “free” score. Taking into account that Turkey was close to the threshold of a
“free” rating from 2004–07, authoritarian and illiberal backlashes were an imminent
possibility that actually came to pass in 2007 and 2008 through events such as the
military’s e-memorandum on April 27, 2007, against Abdullah Gül’s presidential
candidacy,78 and party banning cases against the Democratic Society Party
(Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP), a pro-Kurdish party alleged to be separatist,
which is still continuing; and against the AKP, which is alleged to be anti-secular,
which eventually ended up avoiding a ban.79
It can be argued that such anti-liberal events might be evaluated as being some of
the transitional hurdles Turkey faces in trying to make a transition from what
Schedler calls an “electoral democracy” to a “liberal democracy,”80 or a transition
from what O’Donnell calls a “democratic government” to a “democratic regime.”81
In this transitional process to a fully democratic regime, the creation of a civil
constitution would be especially critical. The AKP government actually attempted
to have a civil and liberal constitutional draft prepared by a commission of
prominent law professors but has not been able to publicly legitimize it or bring it to
parliament. However, if it can succeed in passing such a constitution in the coming
months or years with the support of major opposition parties and civil societal
organizations, it will be quite critical for political modernization in Turkey. It can
even be argued that such a civil and more liberal constitution can safely move
Turkey to a “free” rating on the Freedom House scale.
Conclusion
If Turkey continues political and socioeconomic modernization in the years ahead,
especially in terms of economy, education, and human development, and also
carries out the necessary political reforms such as passing a civil constitution,
Turkey might possibly find itself in a position to experience further democratization
and even consolidate its democracy. In this regard, the EU would be quite important
for Turkey, which could mutually enhance socioeconomic modernization and politi-
cal modernization. Provided that the EU develops fairer, more inclusive and
supportive policies throughout the next years, Turkey’s earning, and more impor-
tantly sustaining, a democratic rating for a couple of years, might possibly signal the
beginning of Turkey’s transcending the “partly free” authoritarian regime and even-
tually reaching a “free” and genuine democracy.
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